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To Prosecute or Not to Prosecute:
A Prosecutor’s Role in Decriminalizing Prostitution
Elisia M. Tadros
Abstract
The criminalization of prostitution has a firm place in American history. But as morality
surrounding this behavior changes, the narrative shifts to one of liberty and safety for sex
workers. This Piece considers the role of a 21st century prosecutor as it relates to the
decriminalization of prostitution. Decriminalization means criminal penalties will not be
imposed for a behavior that is criminalized. As members of the criminal justice system,
prosecutors arguably have the greatest power. Thus, as morality on prostitution changes,
prosecutors are in a position to decriminalize this behavior.
The Piece will begin by identifying the moral and social considerations surrounding
prostitution and provides the spectrum of options available to a prosecutor faced with a
prostitution case. Then, it discusses the power dynamics within the criminal justice system as
well as the theories of prosecution while using marijuana decriminalization as an example of
these ideas at work. Lastly, this Piece will analyze the theories behind a 21st century prosecutor
as applied to the moral and social considerations.
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I NTRODUCTION
Aarica S., now twenty-five years old, will forever have a conviction for soliciting prostitution
looming over her. In 2013, a then seventeen-year-old Aarica was arrested and charged with
prostitution after she agreed to have sex with an undercover officer for sixty dollars.1 Aarica
petitioned to dismiss the case because she was a victim of human trafficking. 2 Since the age of
fourteen, Aarica has been under the control of a pimp who forced her to perform various sexual
acts for profit.3 In the years to follow, Aarica had approximately ten pimps, all of whom took the
money made by Aarica and proceeded to abuse her.4 When Aarica was arrested in 2013, she did
not have a pimp but she sought the undercover officer because she did not have any money.5 The
court denied Aarica’s motion to dismiss and her conviction was upheld because she was no
longer a victim of human trafficking during the time of her solicitation.

1

In re Aarica S., 223 Cal. App. 4th 1480, 1483, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 138 (2014)
Id.
3 Id. at 1483-85; 138-39. At the age of fifteen, Aarica underwent an abortion procedure because her pimp and uncle
forced her to have sex with them resulting in a pregnancy.
4 Id. at 1484; 139.
5 Id. at 1485; 139.
2
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Often labeled the oldest profession, prostitution-6 has been a crime on the books since the 20th
century.7 Internationally, countries are legalizing or decriminalizing the sale of sexual acts.8
Domestically, however, all but one of the fifty states maintain the criminalization of prostitution.9
That being said, there is a current shift towards decriminalizing prostitution in the American
criminal justice system. Decriminalization is the removal of criminal penalties associated with an
action.10 Among the criminal justice actors, prosecutors play a part in decriminalizing prostitution.
Any discussion of decriminalization by prosecutors brings into question prosecutorial
discretion and the renewed interest in the role of the prosecutor in achieving criminal justice
objectives. Prosecutors have become the focus of criminal justice reform because their discretion
provides them with “enormous power.”11 There is greater public scrutiny of prosecutors because
their discretion coupled with prosecutorial misconduct -12 and racial disparities caused by a
prosecutor’s implicit bias-13 are rarely made public. Additionally, the Black Live Matter Movement

6

For purposes of this Piece, prostitution is defined as the engaging in or offering to engage in sexual conduct with
another person in return for some form of compensation. See e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00 (McKinney) (it is a
misdemeanor for a person to engage or agree or offer to “engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for
a fee”); I ND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-2(a) (West 2018) (it is a misdemeanor for a person at least eighteen years of age
to knowingly or intentionally perform, or offer or agree to perform, sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct or
fondle, or offer or agree to fondle, the genitals of another person for money or other property); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-13-512(6) (West 2016) (“prostitution means engaging in, or offering to engage in, sexual activity as a business or
being an inmate in a house of prostitution or loitering in a public place for the purpose of being hired to engage in
sexual activity”).
7 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a) (makes it felony to knowingly transport “any individual in interstate or foreign commerce…
with intent that such individual engages in prostitution”).
8 For examples of European countries that have either legalized prostitution entirely or decriminalized the sale of
sexual services but maintained the criminalization of such services otherwise known as the Nordic Model, see Lena
Reinschmidt, Prostitution in Europe between regulation and prohibition: Comparing legal situations and effects,
I NSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL EDUCATION, 1, 5 (May 2016) (stating that as of 2016, twenty countries
legalized prostitution and four countries follow the Nordic Model).
9 Nevada is the only state in the United States in which prostitution is legal however prostitution is legal only when
taking place in a licensed house of prostitution otherwise it is unlawful to engage in prostitution. NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 201.354 (West 2021).
10 THOMAS B ABOR ET AL ., DRUG POLICY AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 195 (2nd ed. 2018).
11 Jan Ransom & Ashley Southall, Prosecutors Sometimes Behave Badly. Now They May Be Held to Account , THE
NEW YORK TIMES (April 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/nyregion/ny-prosecutors-cuomo.html.
12 Id.
13 Angela J. Davis, The Power and Discretion of the American Prosecutor, 49 DROIT ET C ULTURES 55 (2005)
[hereinafter Power and Discretion].
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and rise in incarceration have sparked a flame in voters. 14 These issues of what a 21st century
prosecutor should look like when exercising discretion and how a prosecutor should conceive their
job when substantive criminal law potentially overlaps with other liberty interests 15 are being
discussed via elections, scholarly work, and conflicts between courts and prosecutors.16
But this discussion of the role of a prosecutor in the decriminalization of prostitution is no
different than the role of a prosecutor in the decriminalization of other actions. Thus, a discussion
of the role of a prosecutor as it relates to this particular behavior, which is substantively
criminalized as prostitution, is necessary. There are different theories of the role of the 21 st century
prosecutor which may have dramatic ramifications on the prosecution of prostitution offenses.
This Piece will address the theoretical and practical discussions by acknowledging the different
ways to think about prosecutorial discretion in the role of the prosecutor which by proxy discusses
the different ways to think about how prosecutors might approach the decriminalization of
prostitution. Part I of this Piece explains the moral and social issues a prosecutor faces when
deciding whether to prosecute a sex worker-17 under the applicable prostitution laws as well as the
types of actions a prosecutor may take. Part II takes a look at the current events surrounding
prosecutors, theories of prosecution, and the power dynamics at play in the criminal justice system.
This Part will also take an illustrative dive into the issues surrounding marijuana decriminalization.

14

Paige St. John & Abbie Vansickle, Prosecutor Elections Now a Front Line in the Justice Wars, THE M ARSHALL
PROJECT (May 23, 2018, 6:00AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/23/prosecutor-elections-now-afront-line-in-the-justice-wars.
15 See discussion infra Part I.A.ii on liberty interests such as sexual autonomy.
16 See Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, 105 M INN. L. R EV. 1415 (2021); Ronald F. Wright,
Jeffrey L. Yates & Carissa Byrne Hessick, Election Contestation and Progressive Prosecutors, OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
(May 2021 forthcoming).
17 For purposes of this Piece, a sex worker is an individual who is compensated in exchange for sexual services. See
Open Society Foundations, 10 Reasons to Decriminalize Sex Work: A Reference Brief, OPEN SOCIETY
FOUNDATIONS, 1 (March 2015) (defining sex worker as an adult “who receive[s] money or other forms of
compensation in exchange for consensual sexual services”).
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Finally, Part III applies the theories discussed in Part II to the decriminalization of prostitution in
light of the issues discussed in Part I.

I.

THE MORAL AND SOCIAL STAGE ON WHICH A PROSECUTOR IS ACTING

This Part discusses some of the moral and social issues in play with the crime of prostitution.
It begins with a brief explanation of why prostitution is considered a moral wrong. It moves to
discuss an emerging view of a sex worker’s dignity and liberty interest in choosing to profit off
their private sexual conduct. Then, it touches on the health and safety risks associated with
prostitution. This Part ends with an examination of the different options available to a prosecutor
by using current events surrounding prosecutorial action when it comes to prosecuting, or not
prosecuting, prostitution.
A. The changing terrain of prostitution laws
Prosecutors have much to think about when deciding whether to prosecute a suspect with a
crime. Basic considerations include the suspect’s age and criminal history, the community’s
safety, whether the prosecutor can prove the suspect committed the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt, and mass incarceration. However, there are considerations that are particularly relevant to
prosecuting the crime of prostitution such as community moral attitudes surrounding this
behavior, a sex worker’s liberty interests, and broader health and social ramifications.
i.

The historical moral underpinning of criminalizing prostitution

All but one American state, Nevada, maintains the criminalization of prostitution. Even in
Nevada, prostitution is not legalized throughout the entire state.18 The law permits prostitution
only in certain counties.19 Additionally, Nevada does not impose taxes on brothels because

18

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.354 (West 2021).
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.345 (West 2021) (requiring a house of prostitution to be in a county with a
population of at least 700,000 people).
19
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taxing prostitution would be legitimizing its legality in the state. 20 This shows the role morality
plays in shaping prostitution laws. It also illustrates that even when the behavior is legalized,
communities are slow to depart from the morals underlying the original criminalization of such a
behavior. This begs the question of whether prostitution is criminalized because it poses a risk to
society’s well-being and/or a sex worker’s well-being or whether it is criminalized because it is
immoral.
When the legislative criminalization of prostitution passed, it expressed what the community,
at the time, believed was morally wrong. Law reflects community morals.21 Also, law reflects
morality in such a way that it cannot contradict natural moral law.22 Historically, religion,
specifically Christianity, regarded sexual acts beyond the scope of marriage as sinful and
immoral.23 The desire to preserve familial integrity and the legitimacy of offspring resulted in the
criminalization of deviant sexual behavior which did not conform to such purposes.24 In the
Middle Ages, such sexual behavior which included prostitution, was tolerated as a necessary evil
to protect women against rape.25 This continued to the late 1600s of Colonial America where
prostitution was not criminalized rather it was viewed as a form of vagrancy.26 Thus, the stigma
surrounding the behavior did not result in its criminalization rather it resulted in regulation.
The pervasive reality of prostitution continued with a shift from a moral narrative to one of
preventing the spread of disease.27 In 1902, the New York Committee of 15 released a report

20

Id. See also, Prostitution Tax Proposed in Nevada, NPR (Mar. 24, 2009, 7:16PM)
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102314296.
21 Arthur Scheller Jr., Law and Morality, 36 M ARQ. L. R EV. 319, 322 (1953).
22 Id.
23 Ruth Mazo Karras, Prostitution in Medieval Europe, H ANDBOOK OF M EDIEVAL SEXUALITY 243, 246 (1996).
24 NEW YORK C OMMITTEE OF 15, THE SOCIAL EVIL 12 (1902) (discussing ancient Greek and Roman legislation
passed in conformity with the religious understanding of family).
25 JEFFREY R ICHARDS, SEX, DISSIDENCE AND DAMNATION: M INORITY GROUPS IN THE M IDDLE AGES 152 (1994).
26 New York Committee of 15, supra note 24, at 20.
27 New York Committee of 15, supra note 24, at 21.
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which investigated and recommended sanitary solutions such as improvements to housing and
health care, instead of the regulation of prostitution.28 However, the conversation returned to one
with moral underpinnings in 1910 when Congress enacted the Mann Act, which in its original
form made it a federal crime to knowingly transport a woman or girl in interstate or foreign
commerce for purposes of prostitution or “any other immoral purpose.” 29 The Mann Act was
passed during the height of the “white slavery” phenomena in which young, white “women
moved to the city and entered the workforce [so] they were no longer protected by the traditional
family-centered system of courtship” and were subjected to temptations.30 This became the
narrative behind prostitution as a way of ensuring women did not deviate in their sexual
behavior.
ii.

Dignity and liberty interests are at stake

Morality surrounding prostitution is slowly evolving. For example, in November 2008, San
Francisco residents voted on a de facto decriminalization of prostitution. 31 The result was 42% in
favor of decriminalization.32 Also, as of 2021, the New York Senate is currently reviewing two
bills proposing the decriminalization of prostitution. 33 Additionally, New York repealed its antiloitering statute which was initially passed to discourage prostitution. 34 These small moves
towards decriminalization illustrate that society’s understanding of this behavior is changing and

28

New York Committee of 15, supra note 24, at 67.
36 Stat. 825 (1910), as amended 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a).
30 The Mann Act, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/kenburns/unforgivable-blackness/mann-act/.
31 Ronald Weitzer, The Movement to Criminalize Sex Work in the United States, 37 J. L. & SOC’Y 61 (2010).
32 Id.
33 N.Y. LEGIS. SEN. S-3075. Reg. Sess. 2021-2022 (2021) https://legislation.nysenate.gov/pdf/bills/2021/S3075 (the
Stop Violence in the Sex Trade Act aims to fully decriminalize prostitution ); N.Y. LEGIS. SEN. S-6040. Reg. Sess.
2021-2022 (2021) https://legislation.nysenate.gov/pdf/bills/2021/S6040 (the Sex Trade Survivors Justice and
Equality Act follows the Nordic Model of decriminalization with a focus on providing support for human trafficking
victims).
34 Jesse McKinley & Luis Ferre-Sadurni, N.Y. Repeals Law That Critics Say Criminalized “Walking While Trans,”
THE N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/03/nyregion/walking-while-trans-ban.html
29
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no longer is morality the primary way to understand consenting adult relationships. Prosecutors
need to be aware of the changing norms with respect to this behavior and how existing dignity
and liberty interests are moving to the forefront of this discussion.
Although dignity is not expressly provided for in the United States Constitution (“the
Constitution”), it was read in by the Supreme Court of the United States (“the Court” or “the
Supreme Court”). Dignity “focuses on the inherent worth of each individual.”35 Closely tied to
dignity interests are liberty interests. Liberty interests are protected under the Constitution,
specifically the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause which states that no state “shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 36 There are two
forms of due process protected under the Constitution- procedural due process and substantive
due process. Procedural due process is concerned with the procedures the government must
follow before it deprives an individual of their liberty; this Piece is not concerned with
procedural due process. Whereas substantive due process is concerned with whether the
government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s liberty; this will be the focus of
this Piece. Substantive due process is used to safeguard (1) economic liberties and (2) the right to
privacy and personal autonomy.
First economic liberty is a constitutional right concerning the ability to pursue a profession.
Often laws regulating employment practices will be upheld so long as the law is rationally
related to serve a legitimate government purpose such as public health or safety.37 In Lochner v.
N.Y., the Supreme Court dealt with an individual who violated a state law which set a maximum
number of hours an individual could work as to protect the health and safety of employees.38 The

35

Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 187 (2011).
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1, cl. 3.
37 Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
38 Id.
36
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Court held that the state law was unconstitutional because it violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause since it was not a valid police power thus interfering with the
freedom to contract.39 However, the Supreme Court has retreated from Lochner’s broad
interpretation of substantive due process and have given greater deference to state legislature
when it comes to issues of health and safety.40
Second, the Court has expressly held that states may not prohibit private consensual activity
between consenting adults because people have a right to privacy and sexual expression. 41 For
example, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court invalidated a state law prohibiting sodomy
because the law was a restriction on the right to privacy.42 The Court went on to explain that
human sexual activity is a fundamental aspect of personhood therefore it is entitled to
constitutional protection.43 However, the Court made a point to note that this case did not involve
public conduct or prostitution.44 This seems to suggest that the law, as of 2003, did not have an
“emerging tradition” or “awareness” of protecting sex workers and their consent, in a similar
manner it did individuals in the LGBTQ -45 community.
Proponents of prostitution decriminalization argue that sex workers should be treated with
dignity because prostitution is a form of work.46 It is important to avoid generalizing why sex
workers turn to prostitution. Although there are a group of sex workers who are abused and

39

Id. at 64.
See, Nebbia v. N.Y., 291 U.S. 502, 516 (1934) (upholding a state law fixing milk prices because the law promoted
public welfare); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, (1937) (upholding a state law that required a
minimum wage for female employees because the Constitution does not spea k of a freedom to contract, therefore
individuals cannot contract for lower wages); U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (stating that
economic regulations are presumed to be constitutional as long as the legislature could have rationally concluded the
means to fit the ends).
41 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
42 Id. at 578.
43 Id. at 567.
44 Id. at 578.
45 “LGBTQ” is an acronym for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer.
46 Open Society Foundations, supra note 17, at 2
40
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forced into prostitution,47 there are also sex workers who choose this line of work on their own
volition. This protects sex workers from government interference in exercising their freedom
such as their freedom of privacy and sexual relationships. 48 Sex workers will choose this work as
their main source of income or as a form of supplemental income. 49 A prosecutor is faced with
decision of whether they should punish a sex worker for the method they make a livelihood
which could infringe on their dignity and economic liberty interests.
Since some sex workers voluntarily engage in commercial sex, prosecuting them may take
away their sexual expression and infringe on their right to privacy.50 Following the Court’s
analysis in Lawrence, dignity gives sex workers the right to decide their own personhood and
whom they choose to have consensual sex with.51 To look at tradition more broadly, tradition has
protected the action of having consensual sex from government interference. To criminalize
adults having voluntary and consensual sex, including commercial sex, “is incompatible with the
human rights to personal autonomy and privacy.”52
The concepts of dignity and liberty are often a concern for prosecutors under the procedural
due process umbrella. When it comes to prosecuting sex workers for prostitution, prosecutors
may be concerned with dignity and liberty under the substantive due process umbrella as well.
iii.

Safety and health for sex workers

Prosecutors are faced with the safety and health issues plaguing sex workers. Proponents of
the decriminalization of prostitution often cite safety and health of sex workers as reasons for

47

See discussion infra Part I.A.iii.
Open Society Foundations, supra note 17, at 2
49 Open Society Foundations, supra note 17, at 2 (citing Devine et al., Pathways to sex-work in Nagaland, India:
Implications for HIV prevention and Community Mobilisation , 22 AIDS CARE 228, 230 (2010)).
50 Open Society Foundations, supra note 17, at 7.
51 Annamarie Forestiere, To Protect Women, Legalize Prostitution, H ARV. C.R.-C.L. L. R EV. (Oct. 1, 2019)
https://harvardcrcl.org/to-protect-women-legalize-prostitution/.
52 Human Rights Watch, Why Sex Work Should be Decriminalized, H UMAN R IGHTS WATCH (Aug. 7, 2019)
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/07/why-sex-work-should-be-decriminalized.
48
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decriminalization.53 Sex workers are subject to violence from clients and law enforcement, and
they may be victims of human trafficking. The criminalization of prostitution may allow for
clients, law enforcement, and traffickers to continue their violence against sex workers because
sex workers risk arrest if they report violence. 54
Where prostitution is a crime, sex workers may feel unsafe reporting crimes, such as abuse,
because they “fear prosecution [and] police surveillance.” 55 Sex workers report crimes at low
rates because of this fear as well as the fear law enforcement will victim-blame the sex
workers.56 For example, a 2017 study surveying sex workers in Baltimore, Maryland revealed
that of the 250 female sex workers surveyed, 22% reported physical or sexual violence by a
client in the past three months.57 Additionally, law enforcement abuse sex workers. Officers may
coerce sex workers into performing sexual acts with the threat of arrest for noncompliance. 58 For
example, the above-mention study revealed that 78% of sex workers surveyed “experience at
least one abusive encounter with the police” in their lifetime.59 “Frequent exposures to abusive
police practices appear to contribute to an environment where client-perpetrated violence is
regularly experienced.”60 A prosecutor may consider this abuse when deciding whether to
prosecute a sex worker.

See Open Society Foundations, supra note 17 at 3; American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), Is Sex Work
Decriminalization the Answer?, ACLU RESEARCH BRIEF (2020) [hereinafter Is Decriminalization the Answer?].
54 ACLU, It’s Time to Decriminalize Sex Work, ACLU (June 8, 2021) https://www.aclu.org/news/topic/its-time-todecriminalize-sex-work/ [hereinafter Time to Decriminalize].
55 Open Society Foundations, supra note 17, at 3 (citing Decker et. al., Human rights violations against sex workers:
burden and effect on HIV, 385 LANCET 186, 187 (2015) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60800-X).
56 ACLU, Is Decriminalization the Answer?, supra note 53, at 7.
57 Katherine Footer et. al., Police-Related Correlates of Client-Perpetrated Violence Among Female Sex Workers in
Baltimore, Maryland, 109 AM. J. PUB. H EALTH 289 (2019).
58 Department of Justice, Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department, C IVIL R IGHTS DIVISION 1, 149
(Aug. 10, 2016).
59 Katherine Footer et. al., supra note 57.
60 Katherine Footer et. al., supra note 57.
53
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In addition to the potential abuse from clients and law enforcement, some sex workers may
be victims of human trafficking. Human trafficking is the “coercion of individuals for sexual
exploitation or forced labor.”61 It is important to note that human trafficking is a separate and
distinct crime from prostitution. Prostitution, unlike human trafficking, is based on consent rather
than coercion.62 The two crimes may overlap; however, the crimes are different. Status as a sex
trafficking victim may be a defense to the crime of prostitution.63 A prosecutor would need to
consider these circumstances and may even enlist the help of sex workers to combat
trafficking.64
Health concerns such as the prevention and transmission of human immunodeficiency virus
(“HIV”) and sexually transmitted infections (“STIs”), may be a consideration for a prosecutor.
Sex workers may not have access to health services, or the local community does not provide sex
worker health programs.65 Decriminalization is associated with financial support for health
programs for sex workers as well as access to, and use of, condoms. 66 Law enforcement conduct
may increase the likelihood of transmission. For example, a 2015 study revealed many sex
workers did not carry condoms in Sacramento, California, because doing so is seen as “evidence

61

Open Society Foundations, supra note 17, at 6.
Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00 (McKinney) (prostitution is a misdemeanor in which a person to engage or
agree or offer to “engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee”) with N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.34
(McKinney) (it is a felony for a person to intentionally force or engage in a scheme or plan to compel or induce a
person being patronized to engage in or continue to engage in prostitution activity by instilling a fea r in the person
being patronized).
63 See I ND. C ODE ANN. § 35-45-4-2(b) (West 2018) (stating that being a victim of trafficking is a defense to
prosecution of prostitution); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.01 (McKinney) (being a victim of sex trafficking is an
affirmative defense to the crime of prostitution); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-513(e) (West 2016) (providing that
being a trafficking victim is a defense to prosecution of a prostitution charge).
64 See Open Society Foundations, supra note 17, at 6 (noting there is no evidence thus far to show that removing the
prohibition on the purchase of sexual services successfully combats human trafficking); Huma n Rights Watch, supra
note 52.
65 Open Society Foundations, supra note 17, at 4.
66 Open Society Foundations, supra note 17, at 4.
62
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of intent to commit prostitution.”67 Also, sex workers in New York City, New York reported law
enforcement confiscating or destroying their condoms.68 The actions of other government actors
may be a concern for prosecutors as well as the effect of such actions.
B. Options available to a prosecutor
Prosecutorial discretion is a prosecutor’s ability to choose from a vast array of options. 69
Often this discretion is seen as providing prosecutors with a great deal of power, which will be
discussed further in Part II.A., however these options may be shaped by many factors.
Recognizing the issues discussed in Part I.A., a prosecutor has a spectrum of options, on one end
the prosecutor may prosecute a sex worker to the fullest extent of the applicable prostitution
statute and on the other end the prosecutor may decline to prosecute altogether.
Looking back to the example of Aarica, there the prosecutor decided to charge her with the
crime of prostitution. The prosecutor chose to follow the black letter law even though Aarica was
a minor and a human trafficking victim who experienced abuse from her pimps and clients. 70
However, the prosecutor in Aarica’s case could have explored other options beyond
prosecuting Aarica for prostitution such as pursuing a lower offense or diversion. These options
are in the middle of the spectrum of available options. For example, if the act of loitering was a
crime in California, then Aarica could have been prosecuted for the lesser offense of general
loitering rather than a misdemeanor.71 Or, if a diversion program was available, then the

67

Kristen DiAngelo, Sex Work and Human Trafficking in the Sacramento Valley; a Needs Assessment , SEX
WORKER OUTREACH PROGRAM 1, 14 (May 2015).
68 PROS Network and Leigh Tomppert, Public Health Crisis: The Impact of Using Condoms as Evidence of
Prostitution in New York City, SEX WORKERS PROJECT 6, 19 (2012).
69 Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 171, 178 (2019) [hereinafter Power of Prosecutors].
70 In re Aarica S., 223 Cal. App. 4th at 1482, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 137 (2014).
71 Loitering, itself, is not a crime in California rather it becomes an offense when coupled with another action. But
see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35 (McKinney, 2020) (the act of loitering is a violation); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-926
(West 2009) (loitering is considered a nuisance).
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prosecutor could have required Aarica to participate in a diversion program.72 Diversion is when
a prosecutor diverts a “defendant out of the criminal justice system entirely” and instead requires
the defendant “to enter a program in order to obtain treatment, compensate victims, [and/or]
demonstrate rehabilitation.”73 If the defendant successfully completes the program then they will
not incur a criminal conviction.74 There are prostitution diversion programs throughout the
United States which range from court affiliated diversion programs to specialty treatment
courts.75 For example, Project Fresh Start in Detroit, Michigan was created to address issues sex
workers face throughout the rehabilitation process and is geared towards helping repeat
offenders.76 The program provides behavioral and lifestyle rehabilitation, health care services
and life skills development.77 Whereas, New York has four prostitution diversion courts, all with
slightly different models but with the intention of rehabilitating sex workers who may or may not
be repeat offenders.78 Of the New York diversion courts, the Midtown Community Court
developed the Services to Access Resources and Safety (“STARS”) program which addresses the
various types of violence that sex workers experience. 79 STARS covers topics with sex workers
such as sexual orientation and stereotypes, safety, trauma and affect regulation, arts education,
feeling identification, financial literacy, cognitive restructuring, setting boundaries and how to
develop healthy relationships as well as the legal consequences of their actions.80

See American Bar Association (“ABA”), Standards for the Prosecution, Standard 3-1.2(e) (stating that
prosecutors should be knowledgeable about and consider “developing alternative to prosecution or conviction that
may be applicable in individual cases or classes of cases”).
73 Beth McCann et. al., Prosecution Office Culture and Diversion Programs, 11 C RIM. L. PRACT . 33 (2020).
74 Id.
75 Daria Mueller, Treatment Courts and Court-Affiliated Diversion Projects for Prostitution in the United States,
PROSTITUTION ALTERNATIVES ROUND TABLE OF THE CHICAGO COALITION FOR THE H OMELESS 1, 9
https://www.issuelab.org/resources/14135/14135.pdf .
76 Id. at 48.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 19-24. See also, Sarah Schweig, Prostitution Diversion Programs, C ENTER FOR C OURT I NNOVATION (July
2012).
79 Sarah Schwieg, supra note 78, at 4.
80 Sarah Schwieg, supra note 78, at 5.
72
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On the end of the spectrum, a prosecutor may decline to pursue any charges.81 There is an
emergence of prosecutor’s offices throughout the United States issuing categorical guidance to
their line-prosecutors authorizing declinations for prostitution charges. 82 For example, in April
2021, Manhattan District Attorney (“D.A.”) Cy Vance announced a categorical policy to
“decline-to-prosecute prostitution.”83 This led to the dismissal of more than 900 prostitution and
unlicensed massage cases.84 The goal of this policy is to “[prevent] unnecessary contact with the
criminal justice system, eliminat[e] the collateral consequences associated with having a
prostitution case or conviction, and [empower] New Yorkers to interact with law enforcement
without fear of arrest or deportation.”85 Similar to D.A. Vance, the Los Angeles County D.A.,
George Gascón, issued a categorial declination policy stating that specific misdemeanor charges
shall be declined or dismissed.86 “Loitering to commit prostitution,” the crime for which Aarica
was charged, is on the list of charges to be declined without exception.87 If Aarica’s case was
brought to the prosecutor on December 8th , 2020 instead of 2013, she would not have been
prosecuted for the crime of loitering to commit prostitution.
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The discretion afforded to prosecutors is vast, and it is best used when it is not
“idiosyncratic” rather when it “tracks widely shared moral intuitions.” 88 Therefore, if the
community’s morals are changing on issue, it is best that the prosecutor’s actions adhere to those
changes. It is also important to note that a prosecutor’s use of their discretion when faced with
the issues discussed in Part I.A. may be shaped by internal programs or policies.

II.

WHAT IS A PROSECUTOR ’S ROLE DURING A PERIOD OF TRANSITION?

The goal of this Part is to discuss the role of a prosecutor on social issues when morality
surrounding a certain issue is changing and the criminal law, which previously went
unquestioned, is now being scrutinized. This Part begins with an introduction of the power
dynamics at play in the criminal justice system while using marijuana decriminalization to
illustrate such dynamics. Then, it will examine the various theories behind the role of the
prosecutor and moves to apply those theories to marijuana decriminalization.
A. What is a prosecutor supposed to do and do they have the power to do it?
The rise of “progressive prosecutors” stepping into their elected positions has triggered a
conversation of what a prosecutor’s role is.89 The progressive prosecutor “hope[s] to harness the
prosecutorial power… in order to dismantle [the mass incarceration system].” 90 In addition to
dismantling the mass incarceration system, progressive prosecutors hope to address root causes
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of crime and ensure racial equality is present within the criminal justice system.91 When
discussing a prosecutor’s role, it is important to discuss whether a prosecutor holds the power
necessary to exact the change they seek.
This Piece will be directing most of its attention on the role of head prosecutors rather than
line-prosecutors.92 “Most head prosecutors are elected”93 whereas line-prosecutors are hired to
implement the policies and procedures put in place by the head prosecutor. 94 Whether a
prosecutor is elected or appointed may influence the office’s policies because the need to “track
popular moral intuitions” to remain in office are different. 95 For example, in a jurisdiction where
the prosecutor is elected, there may be a greater expectation for responsiveness from the
prosecutor towards the community’s “vision for its justice system.” 96 Elections are a “tool of
public accountability,” therefore to remain in the position of prosecutor, the office must act in
accordance to community’s desires.97 Whereas when a prosecutor is appointed, the voters’
desires are more remote in relation to the prosecutor’s actions.
However, any discussion on the role of prosecutors requires an examination of the power
dynamics at play in the criminal justice system. Often prosecutors are described as having a great
deal of power in the criminal justice system. 98 Overly broad legislation and the availability of
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severe punishments effectively gave prosecutors the power of the legislature, executive and
judiciary.99 Yet prosecutors, in the vast majority of states, are part of the political system
therefore their power is tethered to the same checks and balances as other political actors, such as
judges and the legislature. The judiciary, unlike the prosecution, is the ultimate decisionmaker.100 Although prosecutors may provide the court with the case, a plea agreement, and/or
jury instructions, it is the judge who decides whether to take the recommendations of the
prosecutor.101 The role of the judge as a check on prosecutorial power may be heightened if the
judge is also an elected official. Additionally, a prosecutor’s power is dimmed by the legislature,
an elected body in every state, because prosecutors would not be able to enforce a crime unless
the legislature makes an action into a crime. While prosecutors could exercise their power
through declinations, the legislature could “punish the prosecutors for recalcitrance… by cutting
prosecutor office budgets.”102 Therefore, the legislature is yet another check on the prosecutor’s
power.
Even where checks and balances may not be applicable, a prosecutor’s power is dependent
on other actors in the criminal justice system. For example, law enforcement officers, not
prosecutors, detect crime.103 Therefore a prosecutor’s ability to exercise their discretion in
prosecuting a suspect is dependent on law enforcement: (1) detecting crime and (2) choosing not
to let the suspect go as a way of exercising their own law enforcement discretion.104 As members
of the executive branch, law enforcement and prosecutors are both tasked with enforcing the law,
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however a prosecutor’s ability to enforce the law is largely dependent on law enforcement
enforcing the law first.
The conversation surrounding “what a prosecutor is supposed to do” is a difficult one
because it relies on the community’s understanding of criminal law and criminal justice issues.
But these conversations may not get us very far if prosecutors are not able to exact the objectives
tasked by the community. Where morality surrounding an issue begins to change, we see such
discussions surrounding a prosecutor’s role and power struggles come to light.
B. The fight over marijuana decriminalization
Marijuana decriminalization provides a real-world example of the previously discussed
issues and power dynamics. There is a move towards prosecutors declining to prosecute lowlevel marijuana related offenses because prosecuting such offenses are costly and take away
resources from investigating and prosecuting serious crimes. 105 Also, prosecutors are becoming
increasingly aware of the disproportionate impact prosecuting these types of offenses have on
people of color.106
For example, prior to New York’s legalization of recreational marijuana in 2021, a couple of
D.A. offices in the state declined to prosecute low-level marijuana offenses.107 In 2018,
Manhattan D.A. Vance instituted a new marijuana policy requiring line-prosecutors to “decline
to prosecute [a low-level marijuana] arrest.”108 This illustrates the discussion above, where law
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enforcement may be enforcing the current legislation through arrests, but the buck can stop with
the prosecutor.
Of notable mention is Philadelphia D.A. Larry Krasner, whose win in 2017, created friction
within the Philadelphia D.A. Office.109 Line-prosecutors and high-ranking prosecutors within the
office published an open letter stating their unwillingness to work for Krasner; in response, those
who did not resign, were fired.110 This illustrates the power struggle within a prosecutor’s office,
in which line-prosecutors and high ranking prosecutors’ own ideologies do not align with the
head prosecutor. Beyond the internal fight within the organization, in 2018, Krasner made the
decision to no longer prosecute low-level marijuana offenses.111
A prime example of political forces clashing on the issue of marijuana decriminalization took
place in Arlington County, Virginia. An elected prosecutor, Parisa Dehgani-Tafti, ran as a
progressive prosecutor in which she promised not to prosecute low-level drug offenses during
her campaign.112 Dehgani-Tafti used her prosecutorial discretion to dismiss charges or enter into
plea bargains for such offenses.113 However, elected-judges, who were not as reform minded,
required the prosecutors to file a brief explaining why they decided to either drop the charges or
enter into plea bargains.114 Dehgani-Tafti filed a brief to the Virginia Supreme Court arguing that
such an order: (1) infringes on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion which is “well-established
and essential” to pursue justice, (2) permits “intrusive judicial inquiry that is harmful to the
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operation of justice,” (3) is a misuse of resources, and (4) “second-[guesses] the elected local
prosecutor” and undermines local control by the voters. 115 Judge Daniel Fiore, an Arlington
County Circuit Court judge, was not impressed by the argument that prosecuting low-level
marijuana offenses was not a proper use of resources because such a declination would amount
to the executive branch “‘effectively nollify[ing] a statute passed by members of the Virginia
Assembly, who were duly elected by the citizens[.]’”116 Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme Court
declined to pursue this matter.117 But in response to this fight over power, the Virginia legislature
passed a statute requiring a court to grant a motion to dismiss a charge so long as the prosecutor
and defendant agree to the dismissal and the motion to dismiss was not a result of bribery or
bias.118 This situation illustrates the effect “being elected” has on the way criminal justice power
players interact with one another because both the judge and the prosecutor are conforming to
voters’ desires so as to remain in office, but the actors’ understanding of the voters’ desires
conflict.
C. Theories behind prosecution
The issues discussed in Parts II.A and B have led to a much-needed conversation on the
theories behind prosecution. A necessary Supreme Court opinion, Berger v. United States, is
often cited when trying to answer the question of “what is a prosecutor’s role?” In response to a
federal prosecutor “conducting himself in a thoroughly indecorous and improper manner,” 119 the
Court stated that prosecutors have an obligation to ensure justice is done. 120 This responsibility
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comes from the prosecutor’s position as a representative of the “sovereignty whose obligation
[is] to govern impartially[.]”121
The concern with the “doing justice” model of prosecution is that it hinges on the meaning of
“justice.” Justice is a concept that “covers everything and therefore demands nothing.” 122 The
term is extremely malleable as one jurisdiction’s prosecutor may view “justice” as being toughon-crime, whereas another jurisdiction’s prosecutor may view the term to mean prosecuting only
serious offenses. These two prosecutors are ensuring “justice is done,” yet their definitions of
justice are contrary.
This overarching concept of “doing justice” allows prosecutors greater use of their discretion
because whatever action they take would be in the interest of “doing justice.” However, the lack
of uniformity could mean an overnight and overwhelming policy shift with each new prosecutor.
This Part will discuss a handful of, and potentially overlapping, theories falling under “doing
justice” which will be applied throughout the remaining portions of this Piece. These theories
include prosecutors: (1) being tough-on-crime, (2) advocating for victims, (3) ensuring public
safety, (4) fulfilling populist justice, and (5) acting as caretakers of the criminal justice system. 123
i.

Being tough-on-crime

The public’s fear of crime, which is likely a result of media focusing on the most heinous of
crimes, has created a public safety issue in which a tough-on-crime agenda is the solution.124
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Although there is an emergence of progressive prosecutors, the existence of “tough-on-crime”
prosecutors have remained.
These prosecutors see their role simply as enforcers who choose to exercise their discretion
by executing the letter of the law to the greatest extent. This results in increased convictions
which feeds into America’s mass incarceration problem.125 It begs the question of whether
justice should be sought through convictions. The American Bar Association (“ABA”) answers
this question in the negative.126 The ABA’s standard for prosecutors states that the “primary duty
of the prosecutor is to seek justice” rather than get convictions. 127 Yet even with the shift away
from tough-on-crime prosecution, such prosecutors are re-elected due to a lack of voter
knowledge.128
ii.

Victim representation

Victims play a critical role in the criminal justice process and depending on the crime,
prosecutors may feel obligated to advocate for the victim’s rights. 129 Under the current ABA
standards for prosecutors, a prosecutor should consider the “interests of victims” when handling
a case.130 This obligation to advocate for the victim’s rights could result in prosecutor’s being
tough-on-crime. But there is some conflict on this model of prosecution because as Berger stated
the prosecutor represents the sovereignty.131 So although a victim is a member of the
sovereignty, the victim is not the prosecutor’s client. 132
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iii.

Public safety

Often tethered to the idea of ensuring “justice is done,” is the concept of public safety. Here,
the prosecutor’s role is to protect and advocate for the public because it is the sovereign’s safety
that is at risk every time a crime occurs. “Public safety is increasingly invoked” as a reason for
prosecutorial action or inaction.133
However, the concept of safety is malleable and what measures truly promote safety are
“difficult to determine.”134 For example, if a prosecutor believes public safety is best carried out
with harsher criminal penalties due to the deterrent effect on other members of the community,
then the prosecutor is using public safety as a justification for a tough-on-crime approach.135
Whereas, another prosecutor may believe public safety is best severed through diversion
programs because recidivism is believed to be one of the risks to safety. 136
iv.

Populist justice

Populist justice refers to a prosecutor who uses their discretion to fulfill their constituent’s
preference.137 So if a prosecutor decriminalizes an action, then it is because that is what the
voters want, right? Or is it because that is what the prosecutor believes is in the public’s best
interest? These two roles of a prosecutor under the theory of populist justice may not have the
same result.
The former assumes that voters are making informed decisions and researching the
candidates they are voting for. Thus, the prosecutor should bend at the will of their constituents.
More declinations may result from voters no longer approving of a law because those voters no
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longer want that law to be enforced.138 It could be argued voters should not control the
prosecution because they have democratic access to the legislature. Therefore, they could vote
for legislatures who will repeal the law they no longer value. But criminal statues are rarely
repealed.139 Which leaves unsatisfied voters turning to prosecutors for substantive change.
The latter has little faith in voters therefore it views the prosecutor as a trustee for the
public.140 This view holds that prosecutors should work in the best interest of their constituents
rather than implementing their will.141 Similar to “justice” being malleable, so is “best interest.”
Therefore, a prosecutor can be either tough-on all crime or tough-on only the most serious of
crimes so long as it is in the voter’s best interest.
This theory shows the obvious political undertones in the criminal justice process. Where a
prosecutor could listen to their voters or risk losing next term. But even if they win, the lack of
census on whether the prosecutor is to purse the will of voters or is to be their trustee makes this
theory even more difficult to apply.
v.

Caretaker of the criminal justice system

Turning to the last theory, prosecutors as caretakers of the criminal justice system. This
theory, similar to the theories previously discussed, is derived from Berger, in which the Court
stated that a prosecutor “is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law.”142 The
servant-of-the-law or caretaker of the law will not manipulate the system in order to get a
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conviction because the prosecutor does not care about the “wins and losses” rather they care that
justice is served no matter the outcome.143
Under this theory, the prosecutors are guided by the law. This means if “the background law
is severe” then the prosecutor’s actions will be severe.144 This is similar to the tough-on-crime
theory, however under the tough-on-crime theory the prosecutor is exercising their discretion to
prosecute under a more severe law or punishment. Whereas, under the caretaker theory, the
prosecutor is not exercising their discretion in prosecuting the more severe offense rather the
severe option is the only option. Conversely if “the background law is lenient” then the
prosecutor’s actions will be lenient.145 Since the prosecutor is guided by the law, there is little
discretion afforded to the prosecutor under this theory when compared to other theories. This
means that the prosecutor will not decline to pursue a matter simply because the morals
surrounding a crime are changing.146
This theory, unlike the others, is the most neutral and therefore less susceptible to an
individual prosecutor’s political and personal motivations. Additionally, if constituents are
unhappy with prosecutors- as caretakers of the criminal justice system- following the law as it is
set out, then the constituents may exercise their voting power to change legislation.
D. A glance back at marijuana decriminalization
The lack of consensus on issues such as marijuana decriminalization is due, in part, to the
various theories behind prosecution. Beyond the political fight over this issue, each prosecutor’s
own theory surrounding their role has led to inconsistencies within the American criminal justice
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system. The fight for marijuana decriminalization began with a sordid history in which society
viewed marijuana as a threat to the country.147 This perception is largely due to the War on
Drugs, an effort by President Richard Nixon to eliminate drug use. 148 Under the Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”) of 1970, marijuana is federally a Schedule I controlled substances that
is subject to the strictest form of control due to its potential for abuse and dependence.149
An added layer of complexity to the decriminalization of marijuana on the state level is the
maintained criminalization of marijuana on the federal level. 150 However, medicinal use of
marijuana tempered the harshness associated with marijuana criminalization. 151 Medicinal
marijuana is evaluated through scientific research. 152 Now almost all states legalized the use of
medicinal marijuana.153 And 18 of those states legalized the recreational use of marijuana. 154
This Section will apply the above-mentioned theories to the issue of marijuana to illustrate the
complexity of the role prosecutors play in its decriminalization .
i.

Being tough-on-crime

The War on Drugs called for an inherently tough-on-crime policy.155 With the drug war and
the passage of the CSA, prosecutors took a tough-on-crime approach to prosecuting marijuana
offenses which resulted in America’s mass incarceration problem. 156
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On a federal level, there is a move away from a tough-on-crime approach to low-level
marijuana offense because pursuing such offenses would not be “an effective use of federal law
enforcement resources.”157 And states share a similar sentiment as they begin decriminalizing
and legalizing certain marijuana-related behavior. Some prosecutors are met with resistance
when they move away from the tough-on-crime approach to prosecution. For example, as
discussed in Part II.B., Dehgani-Tafti chose to exercise her prosecutorial discretion by not being
tough on all crimes because it would be a misuse of resources that would be better placed on
serious crimes.158 Yet, some Virginia judges resisted this movement. 159
Although a tough-on-crime prosecutor may be attractive when prosecuting heinous crimes
such as murder and rape, their role in low-level marijuana prosecutions is slowly dwindling.
ii.

Victim representation

In the marijuana context, it is difficult to argue the theory of prosecutors advocating for
victims because marijuana possession and use is often labeled a “victimless crime.”160 A
victimless crime is usually one in which the government tries to regulate a vice.161 A vice is a
practice “that partake[s] both in pleasure and wickedness.” 162 Marijuana use and possession
would be characterized as a “victimless crime” because marijuana users are consenting to its
consumption and there is no evidence of injury from marijuana use.163 Therefore, this theory of
prosecution is not viable in this context.
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iii.

Public safety

Whether a prosecutor is acting under the theory of public safety depends on whether the
prosecutor views marijuana as a threat to safety. The War on Drugs was created under the guise
of public safety, but it may have exacerbated existing safety concerns due to its disproportionate
impact.164
If a prosecutor views marijuana as a “gateway drug,”165 then they may be tough-on-crime to
ensure the public’s safety. However, the idea that marijuana use leads to use of dangerous drugs,
such as cocaine and heroin, is debatable.166 There is no evidence to support the idea that
marijuana use leads to use of other drugs,167 nor that it leads to other crimes beyond possession
and distribution of marijuana.168
However, if a prosecutor views mass incarceration and the disproportionate impact of
marijuana enforcement as the threat to public safety, then the prosecutor may either decline to
prosecute or recommend the use of diversion programs. For example, Philadelphia D.A. Krasner
declined to prosecute certain marijuana charges, such as the purchase and possession of
marijuana regardless of its weight in an effort to end mass incarceration. 169 Additionally, it may
be viewed as a threat to public safety to focus resources on non-violent low-level marijuana
offenses when there are violent crimes which threaten safety. 170 Baltimore City State’s Attorney
Marilyn Mosby instituted a marijuana declination policy because “‘no one who is serious about
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165 Centers for Disease and Prevention (“CDC”), Marijuana: How Can it Affect your Health, M ARIJUANA AND
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public safety can honestly say that spending resources to jail people for marijuana use is a smart
way to use our limited time and money.’”171 Therefore, a prosecutor may conduct their own costbenefit analysis of what crimes demand more attention and resources to ensure the community’s
safety.
iv.

Populist justice

When it comes to marijuana decriminalization, it seems this theory prevails. As of 2020, 68%
of Americans support the legalization of marijuana. 172 And 70% of Americans view marijuana
use as morally acceptable.173 Therefore, it would seem to flow logically where marijuana has not
been legalized statutorily that prosecutors may decriminalize it because that is what Americans
want. Under the theory of populist justice, a prosecutor can either bend to the voters’ will or act
as the voters’ trustee.174
During the 2021 election, the sitting Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring stated his
opponent Jason Miyares, who opposed decriminalizing simple possession of marijuana, was “out
of touch with voters.”175 However, Miyares won the 2021 seat for Attorney General on a “law
and order” agenda.176 This shows that Virginians wanted a tough-on-crime prosecutor despite the
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marijuana cases because “courts have been clogged with petty offenses for too long”).
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previous Attorney General’s decriminalization of marijuana and the growing support for
marijuana legalization. Additionally, this example portrays the politics of criminal justice and
how quickly policies surrounding any given issue can change with one election. 177
Newly elected Manhattan D.A. Alvin Bragg is an example of a trustee for voters. In 2019,
New York amended its marijuana statute so that low-level offenses were punishable by a fine. 178
However, Bragg went a step further in stating there is no situation in which his office would
prosecute a marijuana offense and he will institute a declination policy for marijuana charges
when an arrestee has another criminal matter pending such as an outstanding warrant. 179 By
moving the misdemeanor marijuana offense completely out of criminal courts, 180 Bragg is a
trustee advocating greater public safety by not flooding the courts with non-violent misdemeanor
offenses.
v.

Caretaker of the criminal justice system

Since, under this theory the prosecutor is guided by the law, some of the previously discussed
prosecutors are not “doing justice” by declining to prosecute marijuana offenses. If the state has
maintained the criminalization of marijuana, then the prosecutor is required to prosecute the
offense as required by law,181 despite 70% of Americans viewing marijuana use as morally
acceptable.182
Therefore, prosecutors such as Krasner and Dehgani-Tafti are not acting as caretakers of the
criminal justice system. And when judges, such as Virginia Judge Fiore, state that a prosecutor

Prior to the November 2021 election, Virginia was a predominately blue state with a “progressive” agenda. Now
it a predominately red state with a conservative, tough-on-crime agenda.
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179 Alvin Bragg, supra note 171.
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181 Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, supra note 122, at 1213.
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should not “nullify” legislation,183 it can be said that the judge is holding the prosecutor to their
role under this theory of prosecution. Even in states like New York, 184 where certain marijuanarelated behavior is legalized, the prosecutor, under this theory, should not go further than the law
requires. As such, Bragg should not use his prosecutorial discretion to unilaterally decline all
marijuana misdemeanor cases because that is beyond the scope of the statute.
This theory removes some of the politics associated with prosecuting low-level marijuana
offenses while limiting the prosecutor’s discretionary power.

III.

I S PROSTITUTION THE NEXT TARGET FOR DECRIMINALIZATION?

The decriminalization of prostitution is complex because it puts more power in the hands of
prosecutors.185 A prosecutor’s ability to decriminalize prostitution despite its criminalization via
legislation may create tension among criminal justice actors. Similar to the marijuana context, in
which the legislature is slow to move towards decriminalization, prosecutors are in a position to
decriminalize prostitution through declination and diversion policies. Prosecutors are only able to
prosecute behavior which the legislature criminalized, however the presence of such legislation
does not automatically result in prosecution.186 This discretion protects a prosecutor from the
checks and balances associated with being a member of the political process. Therefore, if a
prosecutor declines to charge a sex worker with prostitution, the judicial branch is unable to hold
the prosecutor accountable because the case never makes it that far in the process. Additionally,
if a prosecutor institutes a prostitution declination policy, then law enforcement officers are
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unlikely to enforce the law against sex workers because it would not result to a conviction
therefore it would waste resources that are better suited elsewhere.
With almost unrestrained power, prosecutors can change the legal landscape of prostitution.
But would the theories behind a prosecutor’s role allow them to? The remaining portions of this
Piece will try to answer this question by applying the theories of prosecution to the moral and
social considerations previously discussed in Part I.
A. Being tough-on-crime
A tough-on-crime prosecutor will not result in the decriminalization of prostitution. This
prosecutor would use their discretion to prosecute prostitution to its fullest extent despite the
dignity and health concerns concerned with criminalization of such behavior.
The foundation of prostitution laws is that it is a morally reprehensible behavior. 187 This
moral undertone resulted in the criminalization of prostitution ultimately opening the door for a
prosecutor to be tough-on-crime when punishing this behavior. This punishment is justified
irrespective of whether the prosecutor believes sex workers have a liberty interest in prostitution
because the sex worker is committing a crime.188 Additionally, for a tough-on-crime prosecutor,
decriminalization would not be the answer to preventing the transmission of HIV and STIs
because the transmission rate would not decrease but for the punishment of sex workers. 189
When a sex worker’s safety is at risk due to a client or law enforcement’s actions, a toughon-crime prosecutor may still prosecute the sex worker because the sex worker was committing a
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crime. A tough-on-crime prosecutor wants to prosecute all crime.190 Therefore, in addition to
prosecuting sex workers and potential trafficking victims, a prosecutor would also prosecute the
abuser or trafficker because they are committing a crime.
Since a tough-on-crime prosecutor is concerned with harshly enforcing the criminal law, they
would not support the decriminalization of prostitution.
B. Victim representation
A prosecutor working under the theory of victim representation may not decriminalization
prostitution because prostitution is generally a victimless crime. 191 Like the marijuana context,
when the government criminalizes prostitution, it is trying to regulate the vice of consensual
sexual behavior that is beyond the marital relationship. 192 Although prostitution a “taboo,”193 the
sex worker is consenting. Therefore, under the Lawrence liberty framework, there is no injury to
consensual sex.194
Additionally, decriminalization advocates argue the decriminalization of prostitution creates
an environment in which sex workers and trafficking victims are comfortable reporting abuse
because the threat of prosecution is removed.195 Prosecutors under this theory understand some
sex workers consent to the sale of sexual activities, while other sex workers are being abused or
trafficked. Although statutory limitations are in place protecting human trafficking victims from
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prosecution,196 in practice, establishing a human trafficking defense is difficult because
prostitution laws are “designed to maximize arrests and prosecutions, rather than to identify and
assist people who have been trafficked.”197
Decriminalization may be a way for prosecutors to advocate for victims of abuse or
trafficking by allowing the prosecution of abusers and traffickers without legal recourse on the
victims.
C. Public safety
A prosecutor working under the theory of prosecution would likely decriminalize prostitution
because they want to prevent threats to safety such as harm to sex workers and human trafficking
victims as well as the transmission of HIV and STIs.
Like with marijuana use and possession, there is no evidence that a sex worker engaging in
prostitution commits other crimes beyond prostitution or loitering-related charges. Therefore, sex
workers are not posing a threat to the community’s safety. Rather, advocates for
decriminalization argue the greatest threat to safety is the maintained criminalization of
prostitution.198 The argument that decriminalization will result in more crime has no evidentiary
support.199
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Additionally, if a prosecutor views mass incarceration and the disproportionate impact -200 of
prosecuting sex workers as threat to public safety, then the prosecutor may either decline to
prosecute or recommend the use of diversion programs. 201 For example, newly elected
Manhattan D.A. Bragg declined to prosecute consensual sex trade due to the racial disparities in
enforcement of prostitution laws.202 Bragg stated that focusing on prostitution “jeopardize[s]
public safety,” therefore he will focus on prosecuting individuals coercing others into this work
while also assisting trafficking victims.203 A similar sentiment is shared with Philadelphia D.A.
Krasner,204 and Baltimore Prosecutor Mosby.205 The priority of these prosecutors, similar to their
priorities in imposing marijuana declination policies, is combatting serious crimes rather than the
low-level crime of prostitution.
With the overwhelming evidence and support by researchers and advocates for
decriminalization of prostitution in the interest of public safety, 206 a prosecutor under this theory
is likely to decriminalize such behavior.
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D. Populist justice
A prosecutor under the theory of populist justice would likely decriminalize prostitution
because a majority of voters support decriminalization. Since a prosecutor under populist justice
is cognizant of the voters’ desires, they would conform their policies to maintain their position as
prosecutor.207 Whether a populist justice prosecutor bends to the will of their constituents or acts
as a trustee, decriminalization would result.
First, a prosecutor bending to the will of voters would decriminalize prostitution by declining
to prosecute prostitution. A 2019 Data Progress Survey, surveyed more than one thousand
American voters and found that 52% of voters either somewhat or strongly supported the
decriminalization of sex work.208 The percentages tracked with the voters’ political affiliation as
64% of Democrats and 55% of Independents supported decriminalization while 37% of
Republicans supported decriminalization.209 The Data Progress Survey also showed that twothirds of voters between the ages of 18 to 44 supported decriminalization. 210 The margins
between support and opposition were the narrowest among voters aged 65 years or older, in
which 42% supported decriminalization while 51% opposed.211 This increase in support is not
shocking because a 2008 San Francisco ballot resulted in 42% in the affirmative for prostitution
decriminalization.212 Therefore, a prosecutor who is aware of this increased support for
decriminalization would decline to prosecute sex workers with prostitution.213 Second, a
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prosecutor acting as a trustee for the public would likely decriminalize prostitution because of
the health and safety concerns associated with criminalization. 214 Therefore, working in the best
interest of the public and ensuring their safety would result in decriminalization.
Although, it could be argued that the voters may seek decriminalization from the legislature
rather than prosecutors, the legislature is slow to decriminalize this conduct. For example, in
Washington D.C. and New York, bills were introduced to decriminalize prostitution, however
both did not pass.215 Since repeals are a slow process,216 prosecutors are a better able to provide
the substantive change voters seek by decriminalizing prostitution.
E. Caretaker of the criminal justice system
A prosecutor acting as a caretaker would not decriminalize prostitution because a prosecutor
under this theory will not manipulate the system to conform to their own idiosyncrasies. 217 As
the law currently stands, prostitution is illegal.218 Thus, a prosecutor would prosecute a sex
worker for prostitution as required by law despite the health and social concerns with
criminalization.
The increase in voter support for decriminalization -219 will not affect a prosecutor under this
theory because a caretaker of the system is detached from their own political motivations.
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Therefore, constituents should exercise their voting power by electing legislatures who align
with their views on decriminalization.
CONCLUSION
The maintained criminalization of prostitution and its impact on a sex worker’s liberty, health
and safety is emerging as a concern across the country. Morality is no longer the central focus
surrounding this behavior, as the focus shifted towards liberty and safety. Many scholars
discussed the harsh effect criminalization has on sex workers and have called for its
decriminalization. As the spotlight shines on prosecutors, this Piece attempted to show that as
prostitution remains a crime, prosecutors may be in the best position to decriminalize the
behavior. The 21st century prosecutor has much to think about when exercising their discretion in
a manner that may decriminalize prostitution. With almost unconstrained power, prosecutors
have come under greater scrutiny and conversations questioning the role of a 21st century
prosecutor arose. This Piece does not take a position on which theory of prosecution is best,
however the implementation of these theories may change the legal landscape of prostitution.
Thus, this Piece hopes to provide a legal lens for the prosecutorial decriminalization of
prostitution.
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